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1. Introduction 
During the past 20 years, Ukraine has been suffering from dramatic changes in population size and its 
age structure. The Ukrainian population decreased from 51.6 million in 1990 to 45.4 million in 2010 
and is expected to decrease to 34 million in 2060.1 Between 1990 and 2010, the working-age 
population declined at an average annual rate of 0.33 percent, while the elderly population aged 65 
years and older grew at an average annual rate of 0.64 percent. In the next fifty years (until 2060), 
the working-age population is expected to decline further by about 0.97 percent annually. In the 
same period, the elderly population is expected to grow on average by 0.48 percent annually. As a 
result, the proportion of the elderly in the total population increased from 12.2 percent in 1990 to 
15.5 percent in 2010 and will increase to 26.l percent in 2060. If gender- and age-specific labor force 
participation rates are kept constant, the labor force in Ukraine is projected to shrink by more than 
39 percent by 2060. 
Population aging 2 is already seriously affecting many countries and regions, including Japan, Western 
and Eastern Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Uruguay, Argentina, etc., and it is expected to be a 
growing concern in a number of other countries in the near future. This study focuses on Ukraine 
which is more vulnerable to the negative impacts of an aging and shrinking population than many 
other regions in Europe or elsewhere. First, the country is still undergoing economic, political and 
social transformations triggered by the Soviet Union's collapse and sluggish reforms in transition to a 
new economic and political system. So, the multiple challenges faced by aging countries in terms of 
maintaining and improving living standards, productivity and social cohesion are especially 
formidable in countries like Ukraine where aging takes place against the backdrop of weak 
institutions, structural weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the economy, political instability and low 
level of trust among the population. The interaction of the demographic transition with economic, 
political and social transitions makes Ukraine's experience especially challenging and attractive for 
study. 
Second, aging in Ukraine takes place from below and not from above, i.e. mainly due to a decline in 
fertility and continuous outmigration of the working-age population rather than due to a huge 
increase in life expectancy rates as in developed countries. Besides, there is a huge difference in life 
expectancy between men and women. This limits the possibility to tackle the challenge of Ukraine's 
aging population by significantly increasing the retirement age, especially for men, as it might shorten 
considerably the work-free time in old age and so is not the best option for policymakers. 
Third, compared with higher-income aging countries, Ukraine has fewer financial resources for 
mitigating the negative impacts of population aging on the labor market, the social protection and 
health systems. At the same time, slow progress in the development of financial markets which are 
well needed to introduce mandatory funded second-pillar pension scheme in Ukraine aggravates the 
difficulties of dealing with population aging. 
Fourth, the jobs challenge driven by shrinking and aging population in Ukraine is amplified by 
relatively low levels of labor force participation and labor mobility, poor productivity performance 
and the ineffective use of available human capital. As a result, Ukraine faces a vicious circle : the 
decreasing pool of available working-age individuals puts significant pressure on Ukrainian firms and 
potential foreign investors looking for skilled workers. Skills of the more abundant older cohorts who 
1 The source of data: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2011): World 
Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision. New York. 
2 Population aging is defined as the process by which the balance of a country's population shifts such that the proportion 
of the population that is elderly constitutes a growing proportion when compared with younger ages (Chawla et al., 2007, 
p.47). 
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have completed their education before the transition are less appropriate and less well rewarded in 
the new market environment. At the same time, decreasing young cohorts and ineffective use of 
their skills reduce the innovative capacity of local firms. This seriously undermines Ukraine's 
competitiveness and investment attractiveness under conditions of the global move to a more 
knowledge-based and innovation-led economy. 
Besides, the growing elderly population is placing enormous fiscal pressure that might be 
accommodated by ad hoc measures with an increase of contribution and tax rates among those who 
participate in the formal economy. If so, this will ultimately lead to higher labor costs and a double 
burden on formally employed working-age individuals and formal firms that could create incentives 
for more individuals and firms to exit into the shadow economy and be a source of social strain. In 
the end, the country may fall into a fiscal trap with a lack of socioeconomic opportunities for youth. 
Aging can also make the population less mobile, both professionally and geographically. Such 
negative developments may hinder further economic growth, worsen living standards and adversely 
impact intergenerational relations and social cohesion. This, in turn, can lead to a reversal of recent 
positive trends in fertility and life expectancy and, as a consequence, to more acute aging-related 
problems for the labor market and economic development of Ukraine. 
On the other hand, Ukraine has more opportunities than many other aging societies to adjust to the 
challenges of an aging and shrinking population through increasing labor force participation and 
productivity levels by bringing hitherto idle youth and adults into the workplace, encouraging more 
internal migration and professional mobility of workers, improving and better utilizing their 
knowledge and skills. There is also some scope for increasing productivity through technological and 
organizational innovations and the reallocation of firms and workers from less to more productive 
activities. 
Yet this favorable scenario may come true only if Ukrainian policymakers manage to develop and 
effectively implement a multifaceted approach to the problems being created by the aging 
population. A prerequisite is to create a policy environment that is conducive to sustained job 
creation and productivity growth. The fundamentals including macroeconomic stability, an enabling 
business environment, human capital, the rule of law and modern infrastructure should be a solid 
foundation for Ukraine's job policy. Effective labor policies including the measures that improve skills 
matching, promote labor mobility and effectively protect the most vulnerable workers are important 
not only for supporting efficiently functioning labor markets but also for confronting the aging issue. 
Finally, it is necessary to support creation of more jobs for development, i.e. those that bring positive 
spillovers with respect to living standards, productivity gains and social cohesion, given the country 
context. In Ukraine, a country with a rapidly changing workforce, jobs that maximize the years of 
economic activity and healthy life of population are likely to have large development payoffs. 
Improving fairness in the Ukrainian labor market is another priority task for rebuilding ·social cohesion 
in Ukraine's society and increasing the development payoff of jobs. 
The next section presents an overview of the current and future demographic trends in Ukraine, 
whereas section 3 examines the labor market trends. Section 4 analyses implications of demographic 
changes for the labor market. It directly addresses the potential impact of population aging on labor 
supply and labor productivity leaving aside the implications on public finance and social protection of 
the elderly, health care and long-term care, savings and financial markets. The paper concludes with 
a discussion of policy options for addressing aging-related concerns in the Ukrainian labor market. 
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2. Demographic trends in Ukraine: basic facts 
Ukraine has one of the highest population declines in the world. According to the UN World 
Population data,3 it shared the second posi tion with Bulgaria and Georgia in terms of an average 
annual rate of population decline in 2005-2010 (0.6 percent) among 196 countries with a population 
of 100,000 or more in 2009. The Ukraine's population decreased from 51.6 million in 1990 to 45.4 
million in 2010, representing a loss of more than 12 percent. In the next 50 years, it is expected to 
decrease to 34 million under the medium-fertility variant and to 27.4 million under the low-ferti lity 
variant (Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Total population by variant of projections, 1990-2060 
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Note: Data refer to total population, both sexes combined, as of 1 July of the corresponding year. In 1990-2010 these are 
UN estimates, in 2011-2050 they refer to population projections with four variants depending on the assumption about 
fertility trends. 
Dramatic changes in the size of population have been accompanied with changes in its age structure. 
Between 1990 and 2010, the working-age population (aged 15 to 64 years) declined at an average 
annual rate of 0.33 percent, with an overall loss of 2.3 million people (Table 1). In the same period, 
the elderly population grew at an average annual rate of 0.64 percent and increased by 706 thousand 
people. In the next fifty years (until 2060), the working-age population is expected to decline further 
by about 0.97 percent annually, whereas the elderly population is expected to grow on average by 
0.48 percent annually. As a result, the proportion of the elderly in the total population increased 
from 12.2 percent in 1990 to 15.5 percent in 2010 and will increase to about 26.l percent in 2060 
(under the medium-fertility variant). The natural consequence of aging is an increase in the old-age 
dependency ratio, i.e. the number of people older than 65 years relative to those of working age (15-
64 years). By 2060, this ratio is expected to increase twofold to 45.3 percent (Table 1). 
Ukraine can be classified as "a lready old" because it has surpassed the threshold of 10 percent of 
population in the 65 and older age group a long time ago (Chawla et al. , 2007). But the process of 
population aging speeded up considerably in the last years and it is expected to continue as fertility 
rates in Ukraine have been much below replacement levels since the early 1990-s. This shift toward 
the population structure dominated by older people rather than young is a sign of the third 
demographic transition. It is experienced by many countries in the world which have moved from a 
regime with high fertility and mortality to the one with lower levels of fertility and mortality. 
3 See United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2011) : World Population Prospects: 
The 2010 Revision. New York. 
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Table 1. Population dynamics by age group and old-age dependency ratio, 1991r2060 
Indicator Period Age group Total 0-14 years 15-64 years 65+ years 
Population 1990 11065.8 34261.4 6317.7 51644.9 
(thousand) 2010 6452.8 31971.8 7023.7 45448.3 
2035 5784.6 25597.5 7863.7 39245 .7 
2060 5567.5 19622.5 8896.0 34086.0 
Average annual 1990-2010 -2.55 -0.33 0 .64 -0.60 
growth rate (%) 2010-2060 -0.29 - 0.97 0.48 -0.57 
Proportion of age 1990 21.4 66.3 12.2 100 
group in total 2010 14.2 70.3 15.5 100 
population (%) 2035 14.7 65.2 20.0 100 
2060 16.3 57.6 26.l 100 
Old-age dependency 1990 18.4 
ratio(%) 2010 22.0 
2035 30.7 
2060 45.3 
Source: Author's calculations based on data from UN (2011) . 
Note: In 2011-2060 population projections with medium-fertility variant are used. The old-age dependency ratio is the 
ratio of the number of elderly people at an age when they are generally economically inactive (i.e. aged 65 and over), 
compared to the number of people of working age (i.e. 15-64 years old). 
However, Ukraine is aging in a way which is not similar to Western Europe or Japan. Life expectancies 
in developed countries have been gradually increasing since the 1950-s to 80 years and more {Table 
2). In Ukraine, life expectancy slightly increased between 1950 and 1970 but after reaching a peak in 
1965- 1970 {71.3 years) it declined to 67.5 years in 2005-2010. According to the national statistical 
office - State Statistics Service of Ukraine - recent trends look more optimist ic than those provided 
by the UN: life expectancy at birth increased from 67.96 years in 2004 to 71.15 years in 2012. 
Nevertheless, it is still much below than in developed countries. Furthermore, Ukrainians are not only 
dying younger than the nationals of higher income countries but also have fewer years lived in full 
health as documented by a fairly low level of health adjusted life expectancy (World Bank, 2009). 
Table 2. Life expectancy and fertility trends in Ukraine and selected developed countries, 19Slr 
2010 
Median Life expectancy at bi rth for bot h sexes Total fertility (children per woman) 
age combined (years) 
. 
Country 1950- 1970- 1990- 1995- 2000- 2005- 1950- 1970- 1990- 1995- 2000- 2005· 2010 1955 1975 1995 2000 2005 2010 1955 1975 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Japan 44.9 62.17 73.14 79.45 80.48 81.83 82.73 3.00 2.13 1.48 1.37 1.30 1.31 
Germany 44.3 67.50 71.00 76.02 77.36 78.69 79.85 2.16 1.64 1.30 1.34 1.35 l.3E 
Italy 43.3 66.32 72.14 77.39 78.68 80.20 81.37 2.36 2.35 1.28 1.22 1.25 l.3E 
Finland 42.0 66.09 70.82 75.74 77.03 78.27 79.34 3.00 1.62 1.82 1.74 1.75 1.84 
Austria 41.8 66.26 70.67 76.05 77.39 78.82 80.24 2.08 2.04 1.47 1.37 1.39 1.38 
Greece 41.8 65.86 72.34 77.37 77.95 79.03 79.52 2.29 2.32 1.37 1.30 1.28 1.46 
Switzerland 41.6 69.34 73.71 78.03 79.18 80.69 81.81 2.31 1.87 1.54 1.48 1.41 1.46 
Belgium 41.1 68.37 71.63 76.39 77.49 78.18 79.77 2.34 2.02 1.61 1.60 1.69 1.79 
Portugal 41.0 60.03 68.17 74.68 75.85 77.33 78.59 3.10 2.83 1.51 1.48 1.45 1.36 
Netherlands 40.8 71.93 74.11 77.26 77.85 78.68 80.20 3.05 2.06 1.58 1.60 1.73 1.75 
Ukraine 39.4 65.94 70.13 68.74 67.36 67.59 67.54 2.81 2.16 1.64 1.23 1.15 1.39 
Source: UN (2011). 
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The second difference is that a decline in fertility rates to below replacement levels began in Ukraine 
much later (in the early 1990-s) than in Japan or Western European countries (mainly since the mid-
1970-s), but it has been much more pronounced. In 2000-2005, Ukraine ranked third in the world 
after China Hong Kong SAR and China Macao SAR in terms of the lowest fertility rate over the five-
year period. 
Following the categorization of aging into four types, 4 populations in Japan and Western Europe are 
aging both from below and above with compensation. Aging in Ukraine occurs primarily from below 
and results in significant population losses due to low birth and fertility rates, relatively high mortality 
and morbidity among the working-age population (particularly men) and emigration of working-age 
adults and their families (ETF, 2009). 
Another notable observation is that female-male differentials in life expectancies are much higher in 
Ukraine than in high-income countries. According to the estimates of the State Statistics Service of 
Ukraine in 2012, Ukrainian women are expected to live almost 10 years longer than men (76.02 years 
compared to 66.11 years) . Excessively high and premature mortality of men compared to women 
results in a significant distortion in the gender structure of the population, particularly in older age 
groups (ETF, 2009). Hence, aging of population in Ukraine is accompanied w ith its feminization that 
calls on policymakers to consider the perspective of gender as well as age when developing and 
implementing effective interventions. 
4 Cieslak (2004) described four basic types of population aging: (i) aging from below without compensation (constant 
mortality and declining fertility) ; (ii) aging from below with losses (increasing mortality and declining ferti lity); (iii) aging 
from above with compensation (decl ining mortality and constant fertility); and (iv) aging from below and above with 
compensation (declining mortality and fertility) . 
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3. Recent labor market developments in Ukraine 
3.1. Employment trends 
Total employment increased steadily during 2001-2008, and the share of employed persons in the 
adult population increased from 55.4 to 59.3 percent (Figure 2).5 The economic and financial crisis 
which reached Ukraine in the late 2008 resulted in the significant employment losses, of about 
780,800 jobs. While Ukraine stood out with a strong negative GDP growth rate in 2009 (-14.8 
percent), its employment contraction (-3.7 percent) was in line with many countries that w itnessed 
much milder economic declines. A significant share of employment adjustment, hence, took place 
through internal mechanisms within firms such as shortened working hours, increased use of wage 
arrears and administrative leaves. Despite a slight increase in total employment in 2010-2012, it has 
not yet recovered to the pre-crisis levels yet. At the same time, due to a rapidly shrinking working-age 
population, employment rate reached a historic high of 59.7 percent in 2012. 
Figure 2. Employment of population aged 15-70 years, 2000-2012 
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Source: Sta te Statistics Service of Ukraine (based on the LFS data) . 
Ukraine experienced unprecedented structural changes not only in the age composition of the 
population, but also in employment. The agricu ltura l and industria l sectors experienced reduced 
shares in total employment (Figure 3), as employment in these sectors has contracted by about 20 
percent and 28 percent, respectively, since 2000. Significant employment losses in agriculture and 
industry were more than offset by substantia l gains in financial intermedia tion (an increase of 95.2 
percent between 2000 and 2012), trade, repair, hotels and restaurants (56.8 percent), and real estate, 
rental, and business activities (47.4 percent) . As a resu lt, the market services sector experienced a 
huge increase in its share before the crisis, followed by stabi lization at about 46.6 percent (Figure 4) . 
The largest sector in terms of employment is trade, repair, hotels and restaurants, which accounted 
for 24 percent of total employment in 2012. It is also one of two sectors (the second is real estate, 
rental and other business activities) that grew in 2010-2012 and recovered to the pre-crisis level in 
terms of employment. 
Interestingly, the reforms initiated by the President V. Yanukovych and the Government in 2010 to 
cut expenditures in the public sector but improve the service delivery, including the administration 
reform aimed at reducing the number of public administration officials at all levels, rationalization of 
the school network system in view of decreasing population of school-age children, and the medical 
5 Employment is defined according to the ILO methodology on the basis of the Ukrainian Labor Force Survey (LFS) data 
and refers to individuals aged 15-70 years. 
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reform aimed at improving the quality of health care in an aging but shrinking society, have not 
resulted in significant employment losses. As a consequence, public services accounted for 20 
percent of total employment in 2012 which is even higher than before the economic crisis. 
Figure 3. Sectoral composition of employment in Ukraine, 2000-2012 
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Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine (based on the LFS data), own calculations. 
Note: Public services include education, health care and social work, and public administration. 
Following employment cuts in industry and agriculture, the share of wage and salaried workers fell 
sharply, from around 90.l percent in 2000 to 81.2 percent in 2012. These losses were 
counterbalanced by a double increase in the share of own-account workers (from 8.1 to 17.4 
percent), but it mainly happened due to self-employment in subsistence agriculture, petty trade and 
some other low productivity, small-scale and usually unregistered activities. Most self-employed 
individuals were forced to create jobs for themselves due to a lack of formal wage employment and 
other alternatives rather than being attracted by opportunities, and therefore these are mainly 
"necessity entrepreneurs". According to EBRO (2011), they are less likely to innovate, generate 
knowledge spillovers and contribute to the economic growth than "opportunity entrepreneurs". 
The hypothesis about the widespread "necessity entrepreneurship" in Ukraine may be also supported 
by the negative trends in the occupational structure of employment. The share of unskilled jobs in 
total employment increased from 17.7 to 23.4 percent between 2000 and 2012 (Figure 4), and the 
number of unskilled jobs increased by 31.6 percent. Employment of service workers and shop and 
market sales workers increased by 33.3 percent. Other occupational groups that experienced 
employment gains but much smaller than in the above groups are professionals (14.3 percent) and 
senior officials/ managers (10.1 percent). 
Overall, the share of white-collar and office jobs (the top four occupational groups) fell from 39.2 to 
37.1 percent, mainly due to considerable reduction of jobs for technicians and clerks. The share of 
blue-collar jobs (groups 6-8) also decreased significantly, which is in line with observed employment 
losses in industry and agriculture. Skilled agricultural and fishery workers experienced the most 
severe reduction of employment opportunities: the number of employed persons in this occupational 
group has decreased from 617,000 to 183,000 since 2000. Most rural residents dismissed from 
bankrupt collective agricultural firms (kolkhozes) and having no other opportunities were forced to 
engage in subsistence farming cultivating small pieces of land near their houses and selling some part 
of grown products on markets to survive. As a resu lt, the incidence of informal employment in rural 
areas increased to 89.1 percent in 2012. 
Figure 4. Changes in the occupational composition of employment in Ukraine, 2000 and 2012 
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Strikingly, informal employment grew also in urban areas and in Ukraine as a whole, despite a strong 
economic growth before 2009 (Figure 5) . Analysis of informality rates by age groups revea ls that the 
highest incidence of informal employment is typical of the oldest age group, i.e. persons aged from 60 
to 70 years (56 percent in 2009). High incidence of informal employment among the elderly in urban 
areas can be attributed to a fa irly low statutory retirement age in Ukraine (SS years for women and 60 
years for men), low pension replacement rates and limited employment opportunities in the forma l 
sector; a very high incidence of informal employment among older workers in rural areas is mainly 
explained by the lack of alternatives to subsistence farming and small-scale informal act ivities in rural 
areas (Kupets, 2011). 
Figure 5. Incidence of i nformal and non-standard employment over the business-cycle, 2004-2012 
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employees engaged in at least one type of part-t ime work, temporary work, or multiple jobholding. 
Widespread informal employment contributes to the violation of core workers' r ights in such aspects 
as job security, timely and reasonable remuneration for work done, access to fringe benefits, age and 
gender equality, initial employment for young people, and employment of individuals according to 
their skills and qualifications. However, due to an extensive use by private employers of various 
schemes to cheat workers and ignore their core rights formal employment does not always 
guarantee better working conditions either. Besides, wages are fairly low on average and unevenly 
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differentiated across sectors, regions and individual characteristics. Specific adjustment mechanisms 
such as wage arrears and "envelope wages" (underdeclared income) which are frequently used by 
Ukrainian employers in relation to se lected categories of workers accentuate these problems (Kupets 
et al., 2012). 
As Figure 5 shows, non-standard or vulnerable employment which includes not only informally 
employed workers but also wage employees engaged in at least one type of part-time work, 
temporary work, or multiple jobholding, is also quite widespread in Ukraine. 6 The number of people 
in non-standard employment grew from 5.1 million to 5.6 million between 2004 and 2010. Over the 
same period, the number of people in standard employment decreased from 15.2 million to 14.7 
million. As a result, the share of non-standard employment increased from 25.1 percent in 2004 to 
27.5 percent in 2010. The observed shift into more non-standard forms of employment suggests that 
generally poor labor market prospects in Ukraine, particularly during the economic crisis, have 
obliged workers to take up any work they could find . Persistency of non-standard employment in the 
recovery phase reveals that the hypothesis about the cyclical nature of vulnerable employment in 
Ukraine may be rejected. 
Men, youth (15-24 years), older workers (55+ years), rural residents living in the Western, Central, 
and Northern regions, and those holding unskilled jobs in agriculture or construction have a 
significantly higher probability of holding non-standard employment than their counterparts which is 
supported by the estimation results of the multivariate probit model based on the LFS data in 2004-
2010 (Table A.1 in the Annex) . The fact that men are more prone to vulnerable employment in 
Ukraine contradicts the findings of a similar analysis undertaken by the ILO for 19 European 
economies and Russia, according to which women, on average, have a higher probability of non-
standard employment (ILO, 2012). This may be explained in the same way as a higher probability of 
men to be informally employed (Kupets, 2011; ETF, 2009): failure of the economy to create sufficient 
number of standard jobs with decent working conditions to absorb displaced workers from the 
downsized male-dominated sectors (push effect) and higher propensity of men to take up riskier but 
often better rewarded jobs available in the informal economy (pull effect) . 
Hence, despite an increase in the number of employed from 20.175 million people in 2000 to 20.354 
million in 2012 (see Figure 2 above), the quality of jobs has deteriorated substantially.7 Nevertheless, 
job satisfaction increased compared with the beginning of 2000 but it is still low (Table 3). It is higher 
among better-off individuals with higher or incomplete higher education. Unexpectedly, residents of 
poorer Western oblasts appear to be more satisfied w ith their jobs compared with their counterparts 
living in more prosperous parts of Ukraine. This regional difference in subjective assessments is 
attributed not so much to the differences in the type of jobs as to the differences in the socio-
psychological climate in those regions and the general satisfaction of people with their life and 
situation in the country (UCEPS, 2010). Younger people (18-39) are much less satisfied with their jobs 
than people of retirement age. 
Table 3. Job satisfaction in Ukraine, 2000 vs. 2003 vs. 2010 
6 The typology refers to the charact erist ics of a person's main or only job. A wage employee is classified as a part-time 
employee if he/she usually works less than 30 hours per week in the main job. Workers who were temporarily absent 
from their job and were not sure about the possibility of returning to their employer in the next 6 months, are also 
classified as part-time/temporary workers. As there is no information about the type of employment contract and its 
duration in the LFS, temporary workers were defined according to their answer about involvement in temporary or casual 
jobs during the reference week. 
7 When discussing the quality of jobs based on the LFS data, we omit important information on wages and wage arrears, 
which is missing in the LFS. There is no alternative data source in Ukraine except for the ULMS (Ukrainian Longitudinal 
Monitoring Survey) that would provide micro-level data on important job characteristics and wages simultaneously. 
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Category Score 
UKRAINE February 2000 5.18 
November 2003 5.53 
April 2010 5.65 
REGIONS (2010) West 6 
Center 5.59 
South 5.19 
East 5.8 
AGE (2010) 18-29 5.62 
30-39 5.62 
40-49 5.72 
50-59 5.65 
60+ 6 
EDUCATION (2010) Secondary and secondary vocational 5.44 
Higher and incomplete higher 6.02 
FINANCIAL STATUS (2010) Hardly make ends meet 5.09 
Enough for buying food 5.63 
Enough for life but the purchase of durables is difficu lt 5.55 
Better off but not able to make some purchases 7.05 
SOCIAL CLASS (2010) Middle 5 .9 
Lower 5.08 
Source: Public opinion poll performed by the Razumkov Centre Sociological Service in April 2010 (UCEPS, 2010). 
Note: Mean score based on a 10-point scale from 1 (dissatisfied) to 10 (satisfied). Of all respondents over 18 years old, 
50.4 percent had a job at the time of the interview. 
Figure 6. Job satisfaction in Ukraine and selected countries, 2010 
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Source: Author's calculations based on the EBRO-World Bank Life in Transition Survey in 2010. 
Note: The proportion of employed respondents with definite answers who answered "Agree" and "Strongly agree" on the 
question "All things considered, I am satisfied with my job as a whole". 
According to the EBRO-World Bank Life in Transition Survey in 2010, Ukraine is among ten countries 
at the bottom of the distribution in terms of the share of employees satisfied with their job (Figure 6). 
Only 45.3 percent of the employed respondents were satisfied with their job as a whole. Furthermore, 
less than 30 percent of Ukrainians who were generally satisfied with their jobs were satisfied with 
their financial situation. By comparison, in Sweden the share of workers satisfied with their job and 
financial situation was about 79 percent. Many Ukrainians are not satisfied with their jobs and 
financial situation not only because of low wages per se, but also because the pay for job is unjust 
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given the workers' skills and spent efforts and because job security is rather low (at least according to 
working perceptions). 
3.2. Unemployment and labor underutilization 
Responding to a favorable economic environment, unemployment rates fell from over 10 percent in 
the early 2000-s to 6.4 percent in 2008 (Figure 7). Decrease in labor demand in the wake of the 
economic crisis induced job destruction and layoffs. But not all layoffs resulted in open 
unemployment. On a net basis, about one third of those employees facing job-loss did not join the 
ranks of those looking for employment but withdrew into inactivity, and the unemployment level 
increased by about 533,700 people instead of over 700,000 between 2008 and 2009. This was 
especially the case for males whose overall participation rate declined in 2009 (from 69.8 to 69.2 
percent) . On the contrary, female participation rate increased from 57.5 percent in 2008 to 58.1 
percent in 2009 that might be partly explained by the added worker effect. 
Figure 7. Unemployment of population aged 15-70 years, 2000-2012 
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Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine (based on the LFS data). 
Some groups are more vulnerable to unemployment than others. These are youth, males and urban 
workers (Table 4). Although young people have usually acquired more education and skills tailored to 
the new economic environment than their older counterparts, they are facing particular difficulties in 
entering the labor market and in finding a first significant job in their field because employers are not 
willing to recruit workers without any relevant experience and there are significant obstacles to self-
employment of youth (ETF, 2008; IDSS, 2010). Besides, actual qualifications of young people often do 
not correspond to those according to diploma because of the low quality of post-secondary and 
tertiary education in Ukraine and slow responsiveness of the education and training system to the 
changing labor market needs. The lack of part-time jobs available to students and poor career 
guidance may also be an explanation. In 2012, on average 17.3 percent of economically active people 
aged 15-24 years were unemployed, which is significantly higher than in the other age groups (Table 
3). Furthermore, about half of young college and university graduates holding their first significant 
job after leaving education are overqualified for their job (ETF, 2008). Because so many college and 
university graduates are not finding jobs in their fields of study, the value of tertiary education has 
come into question as the return on investment is not as high as it should be. 
Despite the level of education, many young people appear to be trapped into the lower end of the 
labor market, with less secure workplaces, lower wage levels, less on-the-job training, and weaker 
long-term career prospects. This increases the ri sk of exclusion and poverty among young people and 
negatively affects social cohesiveness of the society as political upheavals in the MENA region have 
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recently shown. Poor labor outcomes for youth are particularly serious in the aging context because 
of the importance of scarce young cohorts in eventually driving the productivity growth needed to 
compensate for the lack of labor supply. 
Table 4. Labor market indicators by sex, place of residence and age group, 2012 
Indicator Category Total 
By age group 
15-24 25-29 30-39 4D-49 50-59 60-70 
Labor force Total 64.6 40.7 81.5 84.4 85.3 65.7 24 
participate rate Female 58.6 35 71 78.3 83.9 59 21.7 
Male 71.3 46.3 91.7 90.7 86.9 74.1 27.4 
Urban 63.3 37.6 82.1 85.1 85.3 63.8 17 
Rural 67.7 47.2 80 82.8 85.3 70.3 39.8 
Employment Total 59.7 33.7 73.8 78.8 80 62.2 24 
rate Female 54.8 29.3 65.3 73.6 79 56.5 21.7 
Male 65.2 37.9 82 84 81.1 69.3 27.4 
Urban 58.5 30.5 74.3 79.S 80.3 60.S 17 
Rural 62.7 40.3 72.S 76.9 79.5 66.4 39.8 
Unemployment Total 7.5 17.3 9.5 6.7 6.2 5.3 0.1 
rate Female 6.4 16.1 8 6 5.8 4.1 0.1 
Male 8.5 18.1 10.6 7.4 6.7 6.5 0 
Urban 7.6 18.9 9.5 6.6 6 5.2 0.1 
Rural 7.4 14.6 9.4 7.1 6.8 5.5 0 
Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine (based on the LFS data). 
Labor force participation rates of older workers (SO years and over) have slightly increased in recent 
years as people of pre-retirement and retirement age have become more active, probably due to 
decreasing pensions in real terms and increasing pressure to support the younger generations 
(children and grandchildren). However, older people experience significant difficult ies in finding any 
other job once they lose their jobs. A specific feature of the Ukrainian labor market is that the 
probability of re-employment is low not only for older cohorts, those skills were largely built for a 
different kind of economic system and those productivity might be low, but also for the people aged 
40-45 years who have lived most of their work life in the new economic environment. This 
phenomenon may be partly explained by to the widespread age discrimination in hiring and 
insufficient number of decent jobs. Under such circumstances, the major motivation for older 
workers is to keep their current jobs at whatever cost, rather than to invest in human capital and 
personal development with subsequent movement to more productive jobs. These behavioral 
patterns clearly restrain productivity growth and effective labor reallocation between the sectors. In 
addition, they provide less room for prospering of workers and moving up the career ladder. Those 
who did not manage to keep their jobs are confined to low productivity work or discouragement and 
inactivity. 
Overall, about 4.4 million working-age people who would be most likely able and ready to work 
under favorable conditions did not work in 2012 because of unsuccessful job search (unemployment 
and discouragement) or because of engagement in household work and dependency (Table 5). In 
addition, according to the official employment statistics based on the survey of enterprises and 
organizations with at least 10 employees, on average 137,900 employees were on unpaid 
administrative leave in 2012 and 736,800 workers were employed part-time for economic reasons. 
Huge labor underutilization seriously affects the growth and development potential of the Ukrainian 
economy. On the other hand, this labor reserve could help meet the aging challenge through an 
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increase in employment and productivity levels by bringing hitherto idle youth and adult s into the 
workplace and better utilizing their knowledge and skills. 
Table 5. The labor force and its underutilization (in thousands of people aged 15-70 years), 2000-
2012 
Labor underutilization Actual labor 
Engagedin force 
household As % of participation 
work and [labor rate 
Labor Unemployed Discouraged dependents Number, force+ (% of total 
Year force Employed (1) (2) (3) (1)+(2)+(3) +(2) +(3)] population) 
2000 22830.8 20175.0 2655.8 719.2 1544.9 4919.9 19.6 63.2 
2001 22426.5 19971.5 2455.0 856.5 1481.9 4793.4 19.4 62.3 
2002 22231.9 20091.2 2140.7 820.1 1476.1 4436.8 18.1 61.9 
2003 22171.3 20163.3 2008.0 766.5 1450.9 4225.4 17.3 61.8 
2004 22202.4 20295.7 1906.7 776.5 1702.9 4386.1 17.8 62 
2005 22280.8 20680.0 1600.8 650.9 2006.8 4258.5 17.1 62.2 
2006 22245.4 20730.4 1515.0 460.4 2220.9 4196.3 16.8 62.2 
2007 22322.3 20904.7 1417.6 372.7 2263.0 4053.4 16.2 62.6 
2008 22397.4 20972.3 1425.1 324.3 2295.9 4045 .3 16.2 63.3 
2009 22150.3 20191.5 1958.8 436.0 2385.l 4779 .9 19.1 63.3 
2010 22051.6 20266.0 1785.6 364.7 2452.2 4602.5 18.5 63.7 
2011 22056.9 20324.2 1732.7 269 .8 2551.2 4553.8 18.3 64.3 
2012 22011.5 20354.3 1657.2 253 .2 2483.4 4393.8 17.8 64.6 
Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine (based on LFS), own calculations. 
Note: "Discouraged" includes workers who searched for a job and despaired of success as well as those who did not know 
how or where to look for a job, believed that there were no suitable jobs, or those who hoped to come back to previous 
work, including seasonal workers. 
But the mobility of working-age Ukrainians between labor market statuses is fairly low. According to 
our est imat ions, 95.6 percent of people who were employed in 2009 were also employed in 2010, 
and 90.8 percent of inactive people in 2009 were also inactive in 2010.8 Much fewer people remained 
in the status of unemployment over a year but their share increased significantly in 2009-2010 
compared with earlier years (Table 6). The probabilities of transition from employment to 
unemployment and from unemployment into employment also reversed their positive trends in 
2009-2010, suggesting that labor market prospects for Ukrainians worsened in the aftermath of the 
economic crisis. Inactivity is frequently used as an alternative status to unemployment during job 
losses and voluntary periods out of work: more than 3.5 percent of those employed in 2009 moved to 
inactivity in 2010, compared with 0.8 percent of those who moved to unemployment, and 21.5 
percent of those previously unemployed who moved to inactivity. During 2004-2006, inactivit y 
8 For this analysis, we used micro data from the Labor Force Survey (LFS) with a rotating panel. In the Ukrainian LFS, each 
sampled person was interviewed a maximum of six times: in three consecutive months of the year t and then in the same 
months of the year t+l . It is therefore possible to com pute year-to-year flow statistics comparing the labor market 
situation of the sample people in years t and t+ 1. Selecting one observation per one person (first observation with a 
complete pair of year-to-year flows) and applying monthly weights for the base period, we calculated transition 
probabilities in the same manner as for the panel data utilizing Markovian flow analysis (Bellmann et al., 1995). The 
transition probability from labor market status i in year t to labor market status j in year t+l is equal to P11=F1j/S1, where F,1 
stands for the number of individuals observed in status i in year t and in status j in year t+l, and S, is the stock of 
individuals in status i in the initial period. The estimates are not corrected for the potential problems of attrition, 
misclassification, and round-tripping. 
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played an even more important role in absorbing both previously employed and unemployed 
individuals. 
Table 6. Transitions between three labor market statuses (percent), 2004-2010 
Period PEE Pw PEN PuE Puu PuN PNE PNu PNN 
2004-2005 92.5 1.0 6.6 45.4 25 .6 29.1 12.4 1.3 86.3 
2005-2006 94.8 0.7 4.5 46.9 27 .6 25.5 11.4 1.0 87.6 
2006-2007 95.9 0.6 3.5 49.S 25.5 25.1 10.1 0.8 89.2 
2007-2008 96.5 0.5 3.0 50.1 24.S 25.4 7.1 0.7 92.3 
2009-2010 95.6 0.8 3.5 48.1 30.4 21.5 8.5 0.8 90.8 
Source: Own calculations based on LFS data. 
Note: Period 2008-2009 is skipped here because of significant changes in the sample design in May 2008. Pq is the 
probability of transition from status i in year t to status j in year t+l multiplied by 100, where E stands for employment, U 
for unemployment, and N for inactivity. See footnote 6 for definitions of transit ion probabilit ies. 
3.3. Policy implications 
Development of the Ukrainian labor market that seems beneficial at first glance - with a slight rise in 
the employment rate and a relatively low unemployment rate - might actually be quite worrisome as 
some quantitative achievements mask negative qualitative changes. Formal full-time jobs which have 
been continuously destroyed in many economic sectors are being replaced by temporary jobs 
created in less knowledge-intensive services and medium or low-technology manufacturing sectors 
with high pollution externalities. Employment growth in high-productivity activities remains very 
limited and mainly confined to the capital city and several agglomerations where large firms w ith 
foreign investment are concentrated. So, the expected transformation of the labor market in favor of 
higher skilled jobs is very slow. Moreover, new jobs do not always provide income opportunities that 
are sufficient to measurably increase living standards. As a consequence, employment does not 
always provide a solid pathway out of poverty, and households with a working member could face 
even more severe economic hardship and social deprivation than households relying on socia l 
assistance, pension, remittances and other income sources. This may discourage many able-bodied 
individuals from participating in the labor force and finding work, at least in Ukraine, what is not a 
healthy sign for the economy with shrinking and aging population. 
Focus groups discussions and sociological surveys show that limited and unfair access to better jobs 
remains a key problem for many groups, especially for youth and older workers, lower-skilled 
workers, and residents of rural areas, small towns and regions with limited employment 
opportunities (Kupets et al., 2012). Education, skills, and personal attributes - which are considered 
the individual' s "employability assets" in developed countries - appear to be less important for 
gaining and maintaining employment in Ukraine than personal connections and social status (often 
defined by family background). Bribery and other forms of corruption are quite widespread 
phenomena in the employment sphere: in order to get a job in the public sector (local authorities, tax 
administration, internal affairs, railway, education, health care, etc.) a worker must pay a sizeable 
bribe or trade in favors, with no guarantees that he/she will be able to keep this job for a relatively 
long time. Existing unfairness in the labor market, which is amplified by widespread corruption and 
informal schemes, is one of the biggest threats to trust, civic engagement, subjective well-being, and 
social cohesion in Ukraine. 
Hence, the Ukrainian labor market seems to be in a bad equilibrium, which is suboptimal from a 
social point of view: private firms create jobs that are not as good as they should be, many people are 
forced to take up these jobs whereas others prefer not to work at all, and existing jobs connect 
people less than would be socially desirable. 
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Such situation cal ls for urgent changes in the jobs policy approach - away from free-hand adjustment 
of the population to the transformation shocks to concerted actions of the state aimed at boosting 
labor demand and job quality, supporting inclusion and fairness in the labor market through a merit 
system and assisting vulnerable groups, and rebuilding trust of workers in public and private 
institutions. Otherwise, Ukrainians will continue to give high preference to a close social network 
(relatives, friends, colleagues, and neighbors) and to the exit option by evading taxes, social security 
contributions and regulations, moving abroad, or withdrawing from the labor force. Alternatively, 
they will search for new forms of voice to influence the formal institutions in the right direction but 
this might eventually end up in more instability of the system, with important implications for the 
business and investment climate. Improvements in job quality will reward Ukraine with a more solid 
basis for growth and development, higher living standards, better productivity performance, and 
declining risk of social unrest. This is particularly important for counterbalancing the negative impacts 
of aging on the labor market and the economy. 
4. Implications of demographic changes for the Ukrainian labor market 
Demographic changes can have direct implications for labor markets through three primary channels: 
labor supply, labor productivity, and labor demand (Chawla et al., 2007, p.73). Population aging is 
expected to increase the share of older workers, who have lower rates of labor force participation, 
and therefore it can lead to a decrease in labor supply and contribute to larger labor shortages. 
Average labor productivity can decline as older workers are usually less productive and less 
responsive to economic opportunities than their younger colleagues because of lower professional 
and geographical mobility. Labor demand can change because of shifts in the structure of aggregate 
demand. For example, due to an aging population and increasing demand for long-term and formal 
care in the EU, health and social care sectors are seen as key sectors with high employment potential 
(EC, 2012). 
4.1. Labor supply changes 
In order to assess whether demographic trends will imply serious problems for the future labor 
supply in Ukraine we examine labor force projections for 2010-2060, starting from the base scenario 
with constant age-specific labor force participation rates at 2010 levels. According to our projection 
exercise, Ukraine is expected to lose 8.4 million workers aged 15 to 64 years between 2010 and 2060, 
or over 39 percent of its 2010 level (see Figure 8 below). Younger cohorts (15-39 years) will shrink 
substantially during the 2020-s as the "baby boom" generation born in the 1980-s reach 40 years and 
move to an older age group. Later, the decline of the labor force will be larger in the age group from 
40 to 64 years as more and more workers from populous cohorts born before the 1990-s 
demographic crisis will retire or die. 
Following the methodology suggested by J. Koettl and applied in the World Bank Golden Growth 
Report (2012a)9, we also ran labor force projections with alternative scenarios which modify labor 
force participations rates in various ways to assess the potential to reverse the shrinking of the labor 
force in Ukraine through policy levers. In addition to the base scenario described above, there are 
five different scenarios: 
• ILO and constant-participation-rate scenario (Scenario 1): as all other scenarios it uses the ILO 
projections of age- and gender-specific labor force participation rates in 2011-2020 (ILO, 2011)1°; 
9 See Chapter 6 on Labor in World Bank (2012a). 
10 Data and the methodological notes are available at: http://laborsta.ilo.org/applv8/data/EAPEP/eapep E.html. 
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then it assumes that these participation rates stay constant from 2020 onwards, and combines the 
2020 participation rates with the UN demographic projections until 2060; 
• convergence to the best performers in Europe (Scenario 2): this scenario assumes that 
participation rates for all age-gender groups in Ukraine will converge by 2060 to the average 
participation rates of European countries with the highest current participation rate for those 
aged 50-74 years (Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Sweden). For the years between 2021 and 
2060, this scenario as well as the next three scenarios assumes a linear adjustment over time; 
• female-to-male convergence (Scenario 3): this scenario assumes that age-specific participation 
rates of Ukrainian women converge to those of men by 2060; 
• increased participation rates in older age groups (Scenario 4): this scenario simulates an increase 
in the labor force participation rate in two oldest age groups (55-59 and 60-64 years) until 2060; 
• the maximum variant (Scenario 5): it combines the effects of the latter three variants. 
Figure 8. Changes in the labor supply by age group (base scenario), 1990-2060 
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Source: Author's calculations based on population projections from UN (2011) - medium variant - and labor force 
participation rates from ILO (2011) for ten five-year age groups. 
Note: The simulation for 2011-2060 assesses changes in the labor force aged 15-39 and 40-64 years assuming that age-
specific labor force participation rates remain constant in 2011-2060 (at the 2010 level). The size of the labor force is 
estimated by multiplying the labor force participation rate data from the ILO with the population data from the UN by 
five-year age groups and then summing up data for two broad age groups. 
Projected age-specific labor force participation rates for both sexes under alternative scenarios are 
provided in Table A.2 in the Annex. Table 7 below summarizes the projection results by presenting 
changes in the labor force in two broad age groups - 15-39 years and 40-64 years - between 2010 
and 2060. It shows that even under very optimistic conditions with a maximum variant (Scenario S) 
when labor force participation rates would exceed 90 percent in all adult age groups (25 to 64 years), 
Ukraine is not likely to counter the shrinking and aging labor force. Under all scenarios the labor force 
will shrink considerably in both age groups. 
Yet the projected losses of the labor force as a percentage of its 2010 level are the lowest in the case 
of convergence to the best performing European countries (Scenarios 2 and 5). From the comparison 
of the labor force participation rates under these two scenarios to those under the base scenario 
(Table A.2 in the Annex) follows that the largest adjustments will need to be made among older 
workers (SO years and older) . 
Table 7. Projected changes in the Ukrainian labor force between 2010 and 2060 by scenario and 
age group 
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Projected changes in the Ukrainian labor force between 2010 and 2060 
Age group Indicator Base 
scenario Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 
Absolute change 
-4931.4 -4649.7 -3582.2 -4183.7 -4649.7 -3376.6 15-39 (thousand) 
Percentage 
-44.1 -41.6 -32.0 -37.4 -41.6 -30.2 
change(%) 
Absolute change 
-3463.3 -3106.S -1601.3 -2747.1 -2354.9 -893.2 40-64 (thousand) 
Percentage 
-33.7 -30.2 -15.6 -26.7 -22.9 -8.7 
change(%) 
Source: Author's calculations based on population projections from UN (2011) - medium variant - and labor force 
participation rates from ILO (2011) for ten five-year age groups. 
Note: Bars correspond to absolute changes in the labor force (left axis) and lines correspond to percentage changes (right 
axis). 
To increase labor force participation in these age groups, it is important that older Ukrainians who 
want to work are not confronted with institutional and financial obstacles, in particular those related 
to a mandatory retirement age and the pension system design. Employers need to create more 
decent jobs for such workers, and the government needs to support creation of more of these jobs. 
At the same time, it is necessary to implement measures to ensure that older workers are able to 
work longer and that their skills match the changing needs of the labor market. 
The labor force projections show that the impact of aging on the labor supply is so stark in Ukraine 
that even considerable increase in labor force participation rates will not help limit the absolute 
decline in the labor force . Increasing immigration from younger countries could augment the labor 
force of the aging country (Chawla et al., 2007). But it is quite unlikely that Ukraine will be able to 
attract skilled immigrant workers in large numbers as long as its richer neighbors such as Russia, 
Belarus, Poland or Hungary provide better employment and income opportunities for immigrant 
workers along with simpler rules of stay and work in these countries and more effective system of 
foreigners' integration.11 At the same time, due to existing wage differentials and demand for foreign 
labor, particularly in the aging European countries and Russia, Ukraine loses thousands of its able-
bodied workers annually as they head abroad in search of better jobs and better lives.12 Although 
international labor migration is likely to have positive effects on Ukraine's development through 
remittances, return migration, and Diaspora involvement, recent studies show that these effects 
have not been fully utilized in Ukraine so far (Malynovska, 2011; Kupets, 2012b; Poznyak, 2012). 
Scarce resources could be more efficiently used via internal migration of the labor force within the 
country. But aging changes the age composition of population and makes the labor force less mobile, 
both professionally and geographically. This creates a barrier to achieving the needed employment 
and productivity levels. According to the recent study of internal labor mobility in Ukraine (Kupets, 
2012a), teens and young adults (15-24 years) who predominantly migrate to pursue professional 
education and/or start families have the highest propensity to migrate within the country (Figure 9). 
11 According to the recently adopted State Programme of the Russian Federation On Employment Promotion (as of 
November 22, 2012), due to the main measures envisaged in the Programme's subcomponent on International Labor 
Migrat ion and allocation of about RUR 140 billion from the Federal budget during 2013-2020, Russia expects to increase 
substantially the inflow of highly skilled professionals from abroad and the total number of foreigners with work permits 
and patents to meet the needs of the Russian economy and to ensure positive net migration (see more at 
http://www. rosm i ntrud. ru/ docs/govern ment/90). 
12 1.2 million, or 3.4 percent of the Ukrainian population aged 15-70, were ident ified as labor migrants from January 2010 
until June 2012, according to the recent Labor Migration Survey 2012, carried out by the State Statistics Service of Ukraine 
in the framework of the ILO-EU Project "Effective Governance of Labor Migration and its Skills Dimensions", 
(http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/press corner/all news/news/2013/2013 OS 31 2 en.htm). 
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Young people made up almost a half of all internal residential migration flows in 2010, as opposed to 
41. 7 percent in 2002. For comparison, the share of prime-age adults (25-59 years) who more often 
move for labor market reasons was 34.6 percent in 2010, down from to 35.9 percent in 2002. Besides, 
younger workers have much higher commuting rates, both within their region of residence and 
outside it, than their older counterparts. 
Figure 9. Gross internal migration rates by age and sex, 2010 
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Source: Figure 3.2 in Ku pets (2012, a) based on population migration data of the State Statist ics Service of Ukraine. 
Note: The gross migration rate shows the number of all documented migration flows within Ukraine in 2010 relative to 
the average annual de jure population for each sex and five-year age group. 
The spatial mobility of Ukrainians within the country is already low, inefficient, and constrained by 
many factors. From the comparison of internal migration rates in Ukraine and other European 
countries done with controlling for the average size and number of geographical units follows that 
actual registered internal migration rates in Ukraine are about half of those that would be expected 
(World Bank, 2012b). Not only actual migration rates are low when compared to other countries, but 
also intentions to migrate within the country. According to the Life in Transition Survey in 2010, only 
0.9 percent of Ukrainians answered positively when asked about intentions to migrate internally in 
the next 12 months. In view of high migration costs and other barriers to permanent residential 
migration, temporary labor migration and commuting becomes an increasingly important substitute 
to residential migration but these flows are often undocumented and biased to the capital city and 
the nearby region.13 Evidence also shows that some Ukrainians living in bordering regions are more 
inclined to find temporary employment abroad than within Ukraine as there is no sense in " trading 
bad for worse" by moving to some other part of Ukraine (Kupets, 2012a). 
Taking into account that an older population is even less likely to migrate to find work and a better 
place to live in, Ukraine needs urgent solutions aimed at removing existing barriers to internal 
mobility to foster mobility of an aging population and to cushion the impact of demographic change 
on the labor market at least partially. Addressing major bureaucratic and practical obstacles to 
efficient internal migration - cumbersome administrative procedures of registration at the place of 
residence (legacy of the old system of propiska), underdeveloped housing and credit markets, strong 
ties to home community and family, lack of appropriate skills and weak formal labor market 
institutions - will allow people to access more and better jobs in leading regions (World Bank, 2012b). 
Establishing and maintaining an efficient road sector, especially by improving bad roads and 
infrastructure, shifting of transport services to more environmentally friendly and safe modes and 
13 Despite an increase in the commuting rate in Ukraine from 10.S percent of total employment in 2005 to 13.2 percent in 
2010, it is still signi ficantly lower than in the developed EU countries (Ku pets, 2012a). 
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systems, ensuring access of the poor and vulnerable adults to affordable transport, considering age-
specific transport needs in the planning and implementation of transport systems and urban 
development will necessarily entail an improvement in mobility and foster equitable development 
(BMZ, 2003). 
4.2. Necessary productivity improvements 
Analysis in the previous section shows that demographic changes make it increasingly difficult to 
continue improving the standard of living of Ukrainians through the labor supply side measures. 
Improvement in the living standards of Ukrainians will increasingly have to come from productivity 
growth. Productivity improvements are essential for offsetting the quantity effects of smaller labor 
force and at least for maintaining living standards at the current level. 
To assess the adjustments in labor productivity measured here as real GDP per person in the labor 
force necessary to cushion the impact of aging on average income, several simple simulations with 
three scenarios for GDP per capita changes and the assumption of constant age-specific labor force 
participation rates have been done (Figure 10). In order to keep real GDP per capita constant (zero 
growth), labor productivity should grow on average by 0.5 percent annually during the next forty 
years, with a particularly pronounced growth needed in 2017-2023 and 2037-2051. If the goal is to 
reach a GDP per capita annual growth rate of 3 percent, the required productivity gain will be much 
more substantial (average annual growth of 3.5 percent in 2011-2050). 
Figure 10. Projected annual changes in labor productivity necessary to cushion the negative impact 
of aging on average income, 2011-2060 
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Note: The simulation assesses changes in the labor productivity measured here as real GDP per person in the labor force 
necessary to maintain constant or increasing GDP per capita between 2011 and 2060, given the expected decline in the 
labor force due to aging. Age-specific labor force participat ion rat es are assumed to be constant in 2011-2060 at the 2010 
level. The basic equat ion for simulation is the following: annual percentage change in GDP per person in the labor force is 
equal to the sum of annual percentage changes in GDP per capita and in the rat io of total population to the labor force. 
Labor force is limited to the population aged 15-64 years. · 
Hence, Ukraine needs to boost productivity growth significantly so that fewer workers could produce 
more goods and services and be better paid. Although Ukraine had strong economic performance in 
terms of GDP and productivity growth in 2000-2008 (Figure 11), it was driven mainly by external and 
temporary factors such as a number of positive reforms, financial stabilization efforts and 
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privatization of loss-making state-owned enterprises, positive terms of trade developments and fast-
growing export prices, idle industrial capacity utilization without significant investments and 
innovation, a surge of capital inflows and credit growth fuelled by commercial banks' external 
borrowing (World Bank, 2010). However, these main drivers of growth in the pre-crisis period are not 
likely to persist in the same order of magnitude over the longer term, the channel of increasing 
output through increased capacity utilization is almost exhausted, and therefore other opportunities 
to sustain productivity growth should be extensively used. 
Figure 11. Real GDP and labor productivity growth rate, 1991-2011 
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First of all, considerable changes in the government policies and institutions are needed to (i) remove 
obstacles to the free business entry/ exit, increase competition and favor production over 
diversionary activities, (ii) foster greater sophistication and diversification of Ukraine's export basket, 
(iii) increase foreign and domestic investment to foster technology absorption, innovation and 
modernization, (iv) improve the quality of infrastructure and public services, particularly education 
and health care (World Bank, 2010). At micro level, workplace productivity could be increased 
through building leadership and management capability, fostering a healthy workplace culture, 
encouraging innovation and exploiting technology, investing in people and skills, organizing 
productive workplaces, exchanging ideas and information with others in the industry and 
collaborating with them.14 
If the expected productivity gains do not materialize in Ukraine, the country will not be able to 
cushion the negative impact of aging on output and income, living standards of many Ukrainians will 
inevitably fall whereas public retirement schemes and the social welfare system will become 
unsustainable. The inability of the state to provide pension and other benefits to an aging population 
can be a source of social tension stretching social cohesion to the limit (WDR, 2012c). 
14 See seven keys to workplace productivity identified by the New Zealand Department of Labor at 
http://www.d ol .govt. nz/ er /bestp ractice/prod uctivity/7 drivers.asp. 
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5. Conclusions 
Faced with a rapidly aging population, Ukraine must act immediately to address the existing jobs 
challenges by putting in place policies to boost productivity, support the participation of more 
working-able Ukrainians in the workforce, strengthen the economy and ensure long-term 
sustainability of public finances and social programs. With an early intervention, the need to take 
drastic actions in the future such as significant tax increases or reductions in public spending may be 
avoided. Furthermore, these policies may reinforce each other over time, and therefore the payoff 
from an early intervention is potentially very large. 
A prerequisite for Ukraine's job policy is to create an environment conducive to higher productivity 
growth, job creation and reallocation starting from the fundamentals: ensuring macroeconomic and 
political stability, promoting the rule of law and protection of rights through an effective and de-
politicized judicial system, improving the efficiency of the business tax system and functioning of 
capital markets, removing direct barriers to international trade and foreign investment, investing in a 
modern world-class infrastructure, and removing the other structural obstacles to doing business, 
investing, innovating, and creating more jobs in the formal sector. Implementation of smaller-scale 
but well-targeted investment programs in the areas, activities and sectors that have the clear 
potential to expand the range of export capabilities of the Ukrainian economy, provide productivity 
spillovers, improve living standards, and enhance social cohesion may be warranted. The risk of 
capture by private interests should be minimized through mechanisms of accountability, 
transparency, and clear eligibility criteria. 
The current context of an aging society also calls for modernization of the education and training 
systems to equip people with broad, flexible, and transferable skills that would enable them to 
progress in their working lives and to adapt quickly to a rapidly changing economic environment. 
Sound public policies aimed at improving health and nutrition of population in a cost-effective 
manner and providing additional resources to support basic research and education are also of 
critical importance for building up the human capital, increasing activity rates and improving 
productivity performance. 
In order to avoid the skills mismatches and labor underutilization that are especially unwelcome in an 
economy with a rapidly shrinking and aging population, effective labor policies and institutions 
should be set on a plateau, with addressing the labor market imperfections but w ithout reducing 
efficiency. It is important to improve labor market information and provide career guidance; remove 
excessive labor market rigidity supported by the outdated Labor Code 1971; encourage flexible work 
arrangements in the formal sector, including part-time work and telework; promote the geographical 
and occupational mobility of the workforce by addressing the institutional bottlenecks that affect 
mobility; strengthen the capacity of Public Employment Service and private employment agencies to 
better match workers to jobs that require the skills they actually possess; assist vulnerable people in 
finding a suitable job and fight discriminatory practices in hiring and pay; protect workers against the 
power of employers and intermediaries and provide more opportunities for voice. 
Finally, policymakers should remove the observed obstacles to creation of good jobs, given the 
country context. In particular, it is necessary to develop a comprehensive approach to promoting 
active aging and extending working life careers as it has been recently done in many developed 
countries facing the aging challenge. 15 Three broad areas where policy actions are necessary to 
encourage labor force participation among older workers include the following: 
15 See the OECD review of ageing and employment policies, recent reforms and measures to st imulate employment of 
older workers in 21 countries-members of the OECD at 
http://www.oecd.org/els/emp/ageingandemploymentpolicies.htm or the European Employment Observatory Review in 
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• tackling employment barriers on the side of employers. Labor-demand-side measures which are of 
critical importance in Ukraine may include reduced or reimbursed social security contributions for 
older workers, subsidized employment targeted specifically at the older age groups, reduced 
payment of sickness benefits by employers or other policy measures to decrease labor costs for 
them. Reforms of employment protection legislation which would liberalize hiring and dismissal of 
employees and would promote an age-neutral approach to collective dismissals; effective 
enforcement of labor legislation regarding the ban to put age limits in job offers and discriminate 
potential workers on the grounds of age; and the implementation of the age-awareness projects 
aimed at changing attitudes towards older workers and at decreasing existing prejudices among 
managers may be also useful to encourage an age-neutral approach in employers' practices. In 
addition, an institutional obstacle that prevents many people from working after reaching a 
statutory retirement age should be revised to provide such workers with a variety of retirement 
transition options; 
• improving the employability of older workers. First of all, it is necessary to strengthen the Public 
Employment Service and better align its information, occupational guidance and job placement 
services to the needs of older workers using the best practices of developed countries. Older 
workers also need help in upgrading their skills to match the changing needs of the labor market, 
so the policy responses may include programs that offer training for older unemployed workers in 
market relevant skills. An education and training benefit (voucher) which is introduced in Ukraine 
since January 1, 2013 according to the new Law On Employment is one of such programs. It is 
designed to be provided to individuals aged 45 years and more who have a social insurance period 
of at least 15 years. Unlike standard labor market training provided by the Public Employment 
Service, it subsidizes training efforts while giving participants some freedom to choose the type of 
training that they want. Alternative policy measures may include programs that encourage 
employers to invest continuously in skills of their workers, including the elderly (lifelong learning 
schemes), and that provide effective instruments to validate skills acquired on the job. Identifying 
sectors and firms where the skills and qualifications of older workers are very valuable and do not 
need significant upgrading (e.g. in health care, education, research and development, retail trade, 
transport and manufacturing) and matching jobseekers to such jobs may be also a right approach 
in the short term. Taking into account poor health and premature mortality of Ukrainians that are 
often linked to poor working conditions and significant stress at work, it is important to implement 
effective policy measures aimed at improving the health status of individuals through positive 
changes in their life styles, reforms in the health care system and significant improvement of the 
quality of jobs in the Ukrainian labor market; 
• encouraging older workers to keep working longer. Despite political speculations about the issue 
and strong opposition of population, Ukraine needs to adjust the age of retirement in accordance 
with changes in life expectancy and demographic trends, remove early retirement privileges for 
large groups of workers and tighten the conditions for unemployment pathways into retirement. 
These changes may be effectively combined with financial incentives to undertake additional years 
of work which generally take the form of a percentage enhancing the pension of the older worker. 
Many older workers would like to remain active longer but not necessarily in the form of 
traditional full-time employment, so age management policies adapting working conditions to 
changing needs and increasing part-time or distance work are of increasing importance. At the 
same time, the government should ensure fair treatment between full -time and part-time workers 
2012 devoted to Employment policies to promote active aging in 33 European countries at http://www.eu-employment-
observatory.net/explore.aspx?years=2012&kevword=Employment%20policies%20to%20promote%20active%20ageing. 
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and improve the working conditions of those taking non-standard employment in the formal 
sector. 
It is important to ensure that all these measures of active aging that often require significant 
financing from the public and private funds do not crowd out the measures fostering employment of 
youth and other vulnerable categories of workers those effective implementation would also provide 
important gains in labor force participation needed to increase the labor supply. As has been 
repeatedly stressed in this paper, the ultimate priority has to be placed on increases in labor 
productivity, professional and geographical labor mobility. Since the option of offsetting some of the 
decline in the labor force and its aging through increased immigration of the skilled young workers is 
less feasible in Ukraine than in richer countries, more efforts should be spent on retaining Ukrainians 
at home and on increasing positive development effects from emigration of Ukrainian workers 
through remittances, return migration, and Diaspora involvement. 
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